We present a framework for analysing intertemporal labour supply and household formation and dissolution decisions in an equilibrium limited-commitment collective framework that allows for marriage both within and across birth cohorts.
Introduction
This paper presents a framework for analysing intertemporal labour supply and household formation and dissolution decisions in an equilibrium limited commitment collective framework that allows for marriage both within and across birth cohorts. We empirically apply this framework to understand both the economic determinants of the age structure of marriages, and the differences in household specialisation patterns within age-similar and age-dissimilar marriages.
Intertemporal collective models extend the collective approach to household decision making introduced by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 to dynamic frameworks. In an environment with limited commitment, as considered in Mazzocco (2007) and Voena (2015) among others, married couples cooperate when making decisions but are unable to commit to future allocations of resources. Household decisions are therefore made efficiently, subject to the constraints that both spouses are able to dissolve the relationship and receive their value from outside of the relationship. These outside options, which determines the bargaining weight of each household member, depends on future prospects in the marriage market. They are therefore governed by the entire distribution of potential future spouses from all marriageable cohorts, and in this paper we make explicit that these distributions are endogenously determined in equilibrium. 1 We present a general discrete choice framework for analysing equilibrium intertemporal collective models with limited commitment. We consider an overlapping generations economy where the marriage market is subject to search frictions: in each period, single individuals meet at most one potential spouse from all marriageable cohorts, 2 observe a marital match quality, and decide whether or not to marry. When married, the marital match quality stochastically evolves, and households make decisions that affect the evolution of state variables and their value outside of the relationship. The bargaining weight within marriage also evolves as a function of these outside options. If the household dissolves, then individuals may remarry in the future. Within this general class of model, we characterize properties of the equilibrium and provide a proof of equilibrium existence. We describe methods for computing the model equilibrium, and exploit the 1 While the importance of extending household model to equilibrium environments is well recognized (e.g. Chiappori and Mazzocco, 2017) , in the context of life-cycle models this has previously been considered extremely difficult or "infeasible" (Eckstein, Keane and Lifshitz, 2016) . 2 To the best of our knowledge, all existing applications of limited commitment household models studies restrict marriages to be within cohort (or equivalently at a fixed age difference) which then permits a standard backward recursion type algorithm to be applied. explicit characterisation of the equilibrium in our estimation.
As an application of our model, we explore the age structure of marriages as an equilibrium marriage market outcome. While age patterns of marriage are relatively less studied in the economics literature, the sociology and demography literature (e.g. England and McClintock, 2009 ) has documented important facts, such as the phenomenon of age hypergamy (men marrying women younger than themselves) becoming much more extreme the older men are when they marry. Building on this evidence, we also show important differences in the time allocation behaviour depending on the age gap. In particular, the labour supply of married women is lower the older is her husband relative to her, even conditional on characteristics including husband's income.
• Describe mechanisms in model that generate age gap. Reference papers for arguments
• Some other papers that have looked at age. Include Siow (1998) , Choo and Siow (2006) , Coles and Francesconi (2011) , Díaz-Giménez and Giolito (2013) , Choo (2015) , Ríos-Rull, Seitz and Tanaka (2016) • Other papers have developed quantitative equilibrium marriage models using different frameworks. Macro literature (e.g. Aiyagari, Greenwood and Guner (2000) , Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2003) , Greenwood et al. (2016) ), Seitz (2009) , Choo (2015) , Goussé, Jacquemet and Robin (2017) , Reynoso (2017) • Papers from sociology and demography literature: England and McClintock (2009) The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a general discrete choice framework for the equilibrium intertemporal limited commitment collective model. Here we detail the behaviour of both single and married households, characterise the equilibrium of the economy, and present our main theoretical results. In Section 3 we then describe our application of the general model and the empirical specification, and in Section 4 we describe our model estimates and model fit. Section 5 then studies the impact of policy reform, and changes in the economic environment, have on the age structure of marriages. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Computational details and proposition proofs are presented in the paper appendix.
2 An equilibrium limited-commitment model
Environment and timing
We consider an overlapping generations economy, in which time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. Every period a new generation (comprising a unit measure of women and men) is born, with each generation living for A < ∞ periods. 3 Women (men) are characterised by their age a f (a m ) and their current state vector ω f (ω m ). As we restrict our attention to stationary equilibria, we do not index any quantity by calendar time.
In what follows it is convenient to adopt a within period timing structure. The startof-period is defined prior to the opening of the marriage market. All surviving individuals enter a new period with an updated state vector (which evolves according to some lawof-motion described below) and are either single or married, with marriage pairings occurring both within (a f = a m ) and across birth cohorts (a f = a m ). All newly born enter the pool of single individuals, as do individuals with non-surviving spouses. At an interim stage, spousal search, matching, renegotiation, and divorce take place. Single women and men meet each other according to some endogenous meeting probabilities that depend on the equilibrium measure of single individuals. The decision to marry then depends on how the value of marriage (including any match-specific component that evolves throughout marriage) compares to the outside options of both individuals. Within marriage household decisions are made efficiently, as in Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 and Apps and Rees (1988) .
If marriage takes place, it follows that the household Pareto weight must be such that the marriage participation constraints are satisfied for both spouses. That is, the value within marriage for both husband and wife must exceed their respective values from singlehood. Importantly, while married couples cooperate when making decisions, we assume that they are unable to commit to future allocations of resources. As in Mazzocco (2007) , Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi (2013) , Gemici and Laufer (2014) , Voena (2015) , Bronson (2015) , Low et al. (2016) , among others, we therefore consider a limitedcommitment intertemporal collective model. 4 Amongst continuing marriages, the Pareto 3 The framework generalizes to incorporate mortality risk, and we include this is our empirical application in Section X. We abstract from these (and other) considerations here to avoid cumbersome notation. 4 Using U.S. data, Mazzocco (2007) tests the consistency of intertemporal household allocations with alternative models of commitment. While the full-commitment intertemporal model (which assumes that the couple can commit ex-ante to future allocations, with the Pareto weight fixed from the time of marriage) is rejected, the limited-commitment intertemporal model (where such commitment is not possible and the Pareto weight evolves given outside options) is not rejected. See, also, the recent contribution in Lise and weight remains unchanged if the marriage participation constraints for both the wife and her husband continue to be satisfied. Otherwise, there is renegotiation, with the Pareto weight adjusting by the smallest amount such they are both satisfied. If no Pareto weight exists such that both participation constraints can be simultaneously satisfied, then the couple divorces. Divorced individuals may remarry in future periods.
The end-of-period is then defined following spousal search, matching, renegotiation, and divorce. At this point, further uncertainty may be realised, 5 and household allocation decisions are made. These household decisions influence the future evolution of the state vectors. All individuals have the common discount factor β ∈ [0, 1].
A central feature of the environment that we consider is that the value both within and outside of marriage depends upon future prospects in the marriage market. These prospects are governed by the entire distribution of potential future spouses from all marriageable cohorts. The equilibrium limited-commitment intertemporal collective framework that we develop makes explicit that these distributions are determined in equilibrium. Equilibrium consistency requires that all individuals and households behave optimally at the end-of-period allocation stage, and in their marriage formation/dissolution decisions, given the marriage market meeting probabilities. Moreover, this behaviour then induces stationary distributions of single and matched individuals that are consistent with these meeting probabilities.
End-of-period decision problem
Following marriage, divorce, and renegotiation, a household decision problem is solved. We consider a general discrete choice formulation where the decision problem is represented as the choice over a finite set of alternatives, and where each choice is associated with some additive alternative-specific error that are only realised at the end-of-period. 6 Yamada (2017), whose estimates also favour limited commitment within the household. 5 We do not allow further renegotiation of the Pareto weight at this stage. This implies that the none of the threshold values that we later derive when characterising marriage/divorce decisions, and the evolution of the Pareto weight, depend upon the realisation of this end-of-period uncertainty.
6 Note that our framework accommodates continuous choices that have been optimized over conditional on each discrete alternative, provided that such continuous choice variables do not enter the state variable transition distribution.
Single women
Consider a single woman and let T f = {1, . . . , T} be the index representation of her choice set. Associated with each alternative t f ∈ T f is the period indirect utility function v S f (t f ; a f , ω f ) and an additive utility shock ε t f . Preferences are intertemporally separable, with the woman's alternative-specific value function consists of two terms: the per-period utility flow and her discounted continuation pay-off. It obeys the Bellman (Bellman, 1957) equation
where E V S f (a f + 1, ω f ) corresponds to the start-of-period expected value from being single at age a f + 1 and with state vector ω f (note: as a matter of convention, we use a tilde to denote start-of-period objects). Recall that start-of-period objects are defined prior to marital search and matching, with this expected value therefore reflecting expected marriage market prospects. The evolution of her state vector is described by the Markov state transition distribution Π f (ω f |a f + 1, ω f , t f ). The solution to the allocation problem is given by
We define the end-of-period expected value function after marital search and matching, but prior to the realisation of the additive utility shocks. Under the maintained assumption that these random utility shocks are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Type-I extreme value errors, and independent of the state variables, it follows from well known results (e.g., McFadden, 1978) that the end-of-period expected value function is given by
where σ ε > 0 is the Type-I extreme value scale parameter, and the expectation is taken over the realisations of the vector of alternative-specific utility shocks ε t f . Finally, we
denote the conditional choice probability for alternative t f being chosen by a single (a f , ω f )-woman. The end-of-period allocation problem (and the associated value functions and conditional choice probabilities) for single men are described symmetrically.
Married couples
In addition to being characterized by their ages a = [a f , a m ] and states ω = [ω f , ω m ], married couples are also characterised by their household Pareto weight and marital match quality. The Pareto weight, denoted λ ∈ [0, 1], is fixed at the time of the end-ofperiod decision process, and determines how much weight is given to the woman when the household collectively determines the allocation. The marital match component consists of a persistent distributional parameter ξ (which evolves throughout the duration of the marriage), and a continuously distributed distributed idiosyncratic component θ ∼ H ξ , which corresponds to the current period match quality. The current match quality θ is a public good and additively enters both spouses' period preferences. As will soon become clear, this characterisation of the marital match quality is convenient as it will imply the existence of various θ-threshold values that are useful when characterising the equilibrium of the marriage market.
The choice set for a married couple is given by T = T f × T m . Associated with each joint alternative t ∈ T are the period utility functions v f (t; a, ω, λ) and v m (t; a, ω, λ), and additive utility shocks. 7 For reasons of tractability, we assume that these additive utility shocks ε t are public in the household and vary with the joint household allocation. The choice-specific value function for a married woman is defined as
where E V f (a + 1, ω , ξ , λ) is the start-of-period expected value function for a married woman. 8 As this expected value is defined prior to the opening of the marriage market, it reflects uncertainty in the idiosyncratic match quality realisations, and therefore the possibility of divorce or renegotiation of the household Pareto weight. The evolution of 7 Note that these period utility functions are allowed to depend directly on λ. This does not represent an arbitrary dependence, but rather should be understood to accommodate a first-step household optimisation problem over some control variables that has been solved conditional on any given joint allocation t. Any such control variables should not directly affect the state transitions.
8 For women with a non-surviving spouse we define
household states is described by the state transition distribution Π(ω |a + 1, ω, t), while the evolution of the persistent marital quality component is described by the distribution K(ξ |ξ). The choice-specific value function for a married man is defined symmetrically.
The household choice-specific value function is defined as the Pareto-weighted sum of the wife's and husband's choice specific value functions
which when maximised over the set of alternatives yields the solution to the household allocation problem
If the household's alternative-specific utility shocks are Type-I extreme value with scale σ ε then the end-of-period expected value for the wife is given by
the conditional choice probability for a type-(a, ω, ξ, λ) married couple. 9 The end-ofperiod expected value function for the husband is defined symmetrically.
Marriage and the start-of-period decision problem
Individuals enter every period with a given marital status. At an interim stage, spousal search, matching, renegotiation, and divorce take place. We now describe this stage. First, we characterize marriage and divorce decisions. Second, we show how the Pareto weight evolves within a marriage. Third, we define a marriage matching function and construct meeting probabilities. Fourth, we use the behaviour at this interim stage to derive expressions for the start-of-period expected value functions.
Reservation match values
A (a f , ω f )-woman and (a m , ω m )-man get married when the idiosyncratic match value θ exceeds the reservation match value θ(a, ω, ξ), which we define as
That is, the reservation match value θ(a, ω, ξ) defines the lowest value of θ for which there exists a household Pareto weight λ such that both spouses prefer to be married over being single. By the same token, and in the absence of any divorce costs, when θ < θ(a, ω, ξ) an existing type-(a, ω, ξ, λ) marriage does not provide any marital surplus and will therefore dissolve. 10
Remark. A sufficient condition for the participation constraints of both spouses to si-
That is, the end-of-period expected value for any individual can be made arbitrarily low through suitable choice of Pareto weight. In this case, we must have λ ∈ (0, 1) in any marriage.
Evolution of the Pareto weights
The household Pareto weight determines an intra-household allocation among the set of allocations on the Pareto frontier. Given an initial start-of-period weight λ, we follow the limited commitment literature by presenting a theory that describes how the Pareto weight evolves given outside options. To proceed, we define θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ) as the value of θ such that the participation constraint of a (a f , ω f )-woman just binds in a type-
and we similarly define θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ) as the value of θ such that the participation constraint of the man binds in a type-(a, ω, ξ, λ) marriage. Before we proceed, we provide the following Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose not. Then there exists an interval of non-zero measure on
where the participation constraints of both spouses are violated at λ. However, no change in λ can simultaneously improve both spouses value within marriage, which contradicts the definition of θ(a, ω, ξ).
We now describe the evolution of the Pareto weight for different realisations of the period marital shock.
This means that the period match quality is sufficiently high such that the participation constraint for each spouse is satisfied at λ. In this event, the Pareto weight is assumed to remain unchanged. Next, suppose that θ(a, ω, ξ) ≤ θ < θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ). In this case the woman triggers the renegotiation of the Pareto weight. Following the limited commitment literature, e.g., Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) , we assume that the Pareto weight will adjust just enough to make the woman indifferent between being married at the renegotiated Pareto weight, which we denote λ * f (a, ω, ξ, θ), and being single. 11 Conversely, suppose that the current match quality satisfies θ(a, ω, ξ) ≤ θ < θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ), meaning that the man's participation constraint is violated at λ. In this case the Pareto weight will be renegotiated downwards to a new weight λ * m (a, ω, ξ, θ) such that man's participation constraint now binds. 12 The Pareto weight transition function, which we note is Markovian, can therefore be 11 We assume that the process of renegotiation itself is costless. As this adjustment procedure only moves the Pareto weight by the minimal amount to maintain marriage, the deviation from the ex-ante efficient allocation is minimised.
12 Formally, for the range θ(a, ω,
summarised by the function λ * (a, ω, ξ, θ, λ) which we define as
Meeting probabilities
The marriage market is characterized by search frictions. We denote the respective probabilities that a (a f , ω f )-woman meets a (a m , ω m )-man and vice-versa by η f (a, ω) and η m (a, ω). These meeting probabilities are endogenous objects that depend both upon the availability of single individuals and an efficiency parameter that determines the extent to which certain types of meetings may be more or less likely. In parametrizing the technology we use ω f and ω m to denote the respective subset of state variables that are fixed over the life-cycle. Letting γ(a, ω) ≥ 0 we then define 13
where g S m (a m , ω m ) is the start-of-period measure of single (a m , ω m )-men and µ m (a m , ω m ) is the total measure (single and married) of such men. Similarly, g S f (a f , ω f ) is the startof-period measure of single (a f , ω f )-women and µ f (a f , ω f ) is the total measure of such women. For consistency we require that
That is, the measure of single (a m , ω m )-men who meet single (a f , ω f )-women is equal to the measure of single (a f , ω f )-women who meet single (a m , ω m )-men.
Start-of-period expected value functions
The start-of-period expected value functions for married women and men are defined after the state vectors ω are updated, and the new persistent marital quality parameter ξ is drawn, but before the current period marital shock θ is realised. The expectations taken over θ therefore reflects any marriage formation/dissolution decisions, and any renegotiation of the start-of-period Pareto weight.
Consider the start-of-period expected value function as a married woman. If θ < θ(a, ω, ξ) then the marriage can not be formed or continued as the surplus is negative for all Pareto weights. In this event, the woman then receives her value as a single, a, ω, ξ, θ, λ) , with this function reflecting any possible renegotiation of the weight given the outside opportunities of both the woman and the man. It therefore follows that the start-of-period expected value function is given by
Now consider a woman's expected value from being single before search and matching in the marriage market occurs. For new matches, the persistent marital component ξ has distribution function K 0 , and we additionally assume the existence of an initial Pareto weight λ 0 ∈ [0, 1] at which potential marriages are first evaluated. 14 The start-of-period expected value for a single (a f , ω f )-woman is given by
14
The assumption of an initial weight λ 0 (which can be renegotiated) is convenient when calculating the equilibrium of our model. See Appendix A for details. An alternative assumption used in the limitedcommitment intertemporal collective literature is that the initial weight is the result of a symmetric Nash bargaining problem, which for θ ≥ θ(a, ω, ξ), equates the surplus from marriage between spouses. That is,
and where we recall that η f (a, ω) is the probability that a (a f , ω f )-woman meets a (a m , ω m )-man. The first line of equation (11) reflects the expected value associated with the different types of men that a given woman may meet. This expectation is defined prior to the realisation of θ and therefore reflects any renegotiation of the Pareto weight from λ 0 , and that meetings may not result in marriage. The second line of the equation corresponds to the case when the woman does not meet any single man in the marriage market and therefore receives her end-of-period expected value from singlehood.
Steady state distributions
The start-of-period expected value functions for single women and men depend upon the probability of meeting a potential spouse of a given type. As made explicit in equations (9a) and (9b), these depend upon the measure of available potential spouses and so are equilibrium objects. In this section we present a theoretical characterization of these objects in the steady state, together with the joint measure of marriage matches. As in our presentation of value functions, it is useful to distinguish between (i) the start-of-
15 At the beginning of each period, a new generation of single women and men are born, with initial measures over the states as given by π 0
f (ω f ) and π 0 m (ω m ). These define the age-1 start-of-period measures
The characterization of the start-of-period matching measures in equation (12c) follows as individuals are initially unmatched. Now consider the start-of-period measure of
This comprises the measure of both single women from the previous period and women who became widows, whose state vector
The start-of-period measure of single males g S m (a m , ω m ) for age 1 < a m ≤ A is defined symmetrically.
We similarly construct the start-of-period measure of matches for ages 1 < a ≤ A. These correspond to the previous period matches, following the realizations of the joint state vectors ω and the persistent marital state ξ, but before the idiosyncratic marital shock (and hence marriage continuation decisions). That is
To complete our characterization we need to define the end-of-period measures, after search, matching, and renegotiation has taken place in the marriage market. Firstly, consider the end-of-period measure of single women aged 1 ≤ a f ≤ A. This consists of the start-of-period measure of single (a f , ω f )-women who do not find a spouse and women of the same type who get divorced. The end-of-period measure of single females is therefore given by
where
The characterization of the end-of-period measure of marriage matches is complicated by the dynamics of the Pareto weight. Recall that this adjusts by the minimal amount if one spouse's participation constraint is not satisfied. To proceed, define h ξ (θ) ≡ dH ξ (θ)/ dθ and denote by ψ f (a, ω, ξ, λ) the density of θ that makes the woman indifferent between being married and not being married while exceeding the couple's reservation match value. Formally we have
This density describes the distribution of draws of θ that result in an adjustment of the Pareto weight in the woman's favour to exactly λ. Symmetrically, define ψ m (a, ω, ξ, λ) for men. The measure of type-(a, ω, ξ, λ) marriage matches then satisfies
and where φ(a, ω, ξ, λ) reflects the density of θ depending upon whether the Pareto weight λ is less than, equal to, or greater than the initial weight λ 0 . That is
The first term in equation (16) accounts for newly formed matches. The second term reflects the measure of matches that entered the period with Pareto weight λ and were not renegotiated. The third term corresponds to the measure of matches that entered the period with Pareto weight less than λ and were renegotiated to satisfy the female's participation constraint at exactly λ. Finally, the fourth term corresponds to the measure of matches that entered the period with Pareto weight less than λ and were renegotiated to satisfy the male's participation constraint at exactly λ.
Equilibrium
We restrict attention to stationary equilibria. In equilibrium, all individuals behave optimally when choosing from the end-of-period set of alternatives, and in their marriage formation/dissolution decisions, given the marriage market meeting probabilities. Equilibrium consistency requires that this behaviour induces stationary distributions of single and matched individuals that are consistent with these meeting probabilities. In Definition 1 we provide a formal definition of equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). A stationary equilibrium consists of (i) allocation choices for single
, and for married couples, t * (a, ω, ε t ); (ii) threshold reservation values for marriage and divorce decisions, θ(a, ω, ξ) , and a transition rule for the Pareto weight, λ * (a, ω, ξ, θ, λ); (iii) start-of-period and end-of-period value functions for single women and men
, and for married women and men
(iv) meeting probabilities η f (a, ω) and η m (a, ω). Such that 1. Household end-of-period allocation decisions solve equations (2) and (5).
2. Marriage and divorce decisions are governed by a reservation threshold value given in equation (7), and the Pareto weight evolves according to the transition function in equation (8) We now state our formal existence proposition.
Proposition 1. Under regularity conditions an equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Appendix ??.
The existence of
Model solution
There are two important numerical complications in our analysis. First, the individual value functions are dependent on the equilibrium meeting probabilities. Second, we allow for marriages across cohorts, so that even if these meeting probabilities were known, a standard backward induction procedure can not be applied. We address the first issue by solving the model conditional on the meeting probabilities, and then using the steady state flow equations (see Section 2.4) to update the meeting probabilities, and then iterating until equilibrium consistency is obtained. We address the second issue by noting that knowledge of E V S f (a f , ω f ) and E V S m (a m , ω m ) for all a f , a m , ω f , and ω m (together with the meeting probabilities) facilitates a backward induction procedure conditional on a given spousal age gap. These expected values capture the potential marital opportunities for spouses from all possible cohorts. We can then jointly iterate on the expected value functions of being single and the meeting probabilities. Further details concerning the model solution, together with practical numerical issues when calculating expected value functions and steady state measures, are presented in Appendix A. 16
Application: the age structure of marriages
There is important variation in the age structure of marriages, both cross-sectionally, and over the life-cycle. Firstly, in the cross section there is the well known tendency for men to be married to women younger than themselves (see Figure 1a) , a phenomenon referred to as age hypergamy. Secondly, and as documented in England and McClintock (2009) , while age hypergamy becomes much more extreme the older men are when they marry, it is much less strongly related to the woman's age at marriage (see Figure 1b) . Thirdly, there are significant imbalances in the relative number of single men compared to single women by age. For example, there are 20% more single women in their 50's compared to single men of the same age (see Figure 2 ).
Age differences also exhibit an important influence on patterns of specialisation within the household. In Table 1 we examine the relationship between a woman's employment and the age difference in marriage. Even conditioning upon a rich set of controls including children and her husband's income, the employment rate of women is lower the older is her husband relative to her. Compared to an age difference of between 0 and 2 years, a woman whose husband is aged 3-5 years older has around a 1 percentage point lower probability of employment. If the husband is aged 6-10 years older than her there is a 2 percentage point lower probability of employment. Finally, 
Empirical parametrisation
As an application of our equilibrium limited-commitment framework we empirically implement a model with labour market earnings risk, human capital accumulation, home production activities, fertility, and both within-and across-cohort marital matching. Relative to the framework developed in Section 2, our application considers a slightly generalised environment, with these extensions omitted from the earlier presentation as they require further notation but do not fundamentally change the analysis.
Theoretical extensions
Mortality Risk. Let σ f (a f ) denote the exogenous probability that a women aged a f − 1 survives to age a f . For men we similarly define σ m (a m ). These survival probabilities change the discounting of the continuation value, and for individuals in couples, the continuation value also reflects that an individual with a non-surviving spouse is single next period. While the start-of-period measures are similarly modified, the definition of the end-of-period measures is unaffected.
Divorce costs. Consider introducing one-time additive utility costs κ in the event that a marriage is dissolved. For example, the participation constraint for a currently married woman now becomes EV f (a, ω, ξ, λ) + θ ≥ EV S f (a f , ω f ) − κ f . This introduces a wedge in the threshold values for marriage and divorce decisions, and the Markovian Pareto weight transition function.
End-of-period uncertainty. In addition to the state-specific errors that are attached to the time allocation alternatives, and which are only realised at the end-of-period, consider allowing for general idiosyncratic uncertainty ∼ Ξ for married couples (and similarly for single women and men). The end-of-period decision problems are solved conditional on these, with the end-of-period expected value function calculated by integrating over this distribution.
Preferences, endowments, and choices
Individuals enter the economy as singles with no children and are endowed with both an education level s ∈ {s L , s H }, which respectively corresponds to high school graduate and below, and college and above, and an innate productivity endowment φ ∈ {φ L , φ H }. 18 Together, these represent the persistent type heterogeneity of an individual.
At the end-of-period decision stage, individual's and household's choose consumption and time allocations given their current state. For a single woman, this will depend upon her age a f , the number of children n c , the age of her youngest child y c , her human capital level k f , her education s f , her productivity type φ f , her transitory wage realisation w f , and her vector of state-specific preference shocks ε t f . Conditional upon these, she chooses how to allocate her time between leisure f , market work time h q f , and home production time h Q f . Her within-period preferences are described by a direct utility function that is defined over her leisure f , consumption of a private market good q f , and consumption of a non-marketable good Q f that is produced with home time. We adopt the parametrisation
The preferences and decisions of a single man are defined symmetrically. For a married couple, their consumption and time allocation choice will depend upon the characteristics of all household members, (a, n c , y c , k, s, φ, , ε t ) , together with the persistent marital quality component ξ and the Pareto weight λ. The within-period preferences for each spouse are unaffected by marital status. Given these preferences, and the constraints and technology of the household, we next proceed to characterise the period indirect utility functions for single and married women and men.
Singles: End-of-period time allocation problem
Consider a single (a f , ω f )-woman. From a finite and discrete set of alternatives she chooses how to allocate her time between leisure f , market work time h q f , and home production time h Q f . 19 Her consumption of the private market good depends on her work hours h q f through the static budget constraint
is her hourly wage (which depends on the realisation of end-ofperiod uncertainty), T S (·) is the tax schedule for a single individual, and C(·) are childcare expenditures that depend on her labour supply and both the number (n c ) and age (y c ) of any children. 20 Similarly, consumption of the non-marketable home good depends upon the woman's time input h Q f through the production function
The home efficiency parameter depends upon the woman's education, and both the number and age of her children. Substituting the budget constraint and home production technology in her utility function we obtain the indirect utility function
is the bijective function that defines the index representation of the time alternatives. We obtain v S m (t m ; ω m , m ) symmetrically.
Married couples: End-of-period time allocation problem
Consider now a married (a, ω, ξ, λ)-couple. The household time allocation determines the total consumption of the private good, together with the consumption of the nonmarketable home produced good. The latter is produced by combining the home time of the husband and wife, and is public within the household. The production technology is parametrised as Q = Q f m (h Q ; ω) ≡ ζ f m (s, n c , y c ) · h α Q f · h 1−α Qm , with the efficiency parameter depending upon both spouses education (allowing for potential complementarities) and the number and age of any children. Given labour supplies, the household consumption of the private good is then uniquely determined by the household budget constraint
. 19 We allow for a maximum of 8 alternatives for each individual. Expressed in hours per week, and suppressing the indexing by gender, the index representation of an individual choice set is given by 20, 20, 40, 40, 40, 60, 60] , and (h t Q ) t∈T = [45, 25, 45, 5, 25, 45, 5, 25] , with t = 115 − h t q − h t Q . 20 Our calculation of taxes and transfers closely follows Gayle and Shephard (2016) , although here we do not allow for state variation. For childcare expenditure, we set it to the average amount that we obtain from the data.
With a static budget constraint, the private good resource division problem reduces to a a static optimisation problem
The solution to this constrained maximization problem defines private consumption for both the wife q f (t; ω, , λ) and her husband q m (t; ω, , λ) , satisfying q f + q m = q. The indirect utility function can then be obtained as v f (t; ω, , λ ; ω) ; ω m ).
Wages and human capital
Workers accumulate skills while working, with the log hourly wage for worker i when aged a given by
and where we note that the parameters of the wage process including the distribution of shocks are both education-and gender-specific. The variable k ia measures acquired human capital, which is restricted to take pre-specified values on a grid, k ia ∈ [0 = k 1 , . . . , k K ]. All workers enter the model with k i1 = k 1 = 0 which then evolves according to a discrete state Markov chain. The human capital transition density is given by
, which depends on current labour supply h q . We consider a low-dimensional parametrisation of the transition density by defining π k (o, p, 0) to be a lower-diagonal matrix which, for p > 1, defines a constant probability δ 0 of an incremental reduction in their human capital. Similarly, let π k (o, p, h q ) be a upper-diagonal matrix, which for p < K, defines a constant probability δ 1 of an incremental improvement in human capital. For general h q we construct a weighted average of these transition densities
with the parameter υ k > 0 determining the importance of employment versus work hours in the human capital accumulation process. Finally, the residual component in the log-wage equation comprises a permanent component φ i and an i.i.d. transitory component wia .
Fertility and children
We do not explicitly model the fertility decision, but rather assume that children arrive according to some stochastic process. To this end, we estimate non-parametric regression models that describe the probability that a child is born as a function of the woman's age. 21 Separate regressions are performed depending upon marital status, the education level of the woman, and whether there are any other children in the household. These imply non-parametric estimates for the probabilities Pr[y c,a f = 0|s,
Children enter the model in the following ways. First, they enter the budget constraint, with children affecting both taxes and costs of work (through childcare costs). Second, they are considered public goods in the household, with children affecting the productivity of home time. In the event of divorce (the cost of which may depend upon the presence of children), any children are assumed to remain with the mother and no longer enter the (now) ex-husband's state space. When a single women with children marries, her children (regardless of whether they were born in a previous marriage or when single) enter the combined state space and the new household treats the children as its own. To help rationalise the observation that single women with children have lower marriage rates than those without children, we follow Bronson (2015) by incorporating a one-time utility cost when marriages with existing children are formed. 22
Marriage quality and matching
The marital match component consists of a persistent distributional parameter ξ, and a continuously distributed distributed idiosyncratic component θ ∼ H ξ . We allow the distributional parameter to take two values, ξ ∈ {ξ L , ξ H }, and define π ξ (o, p) = Pr[ξ = ξ o |ξ = ξ p ] as the respective Markovian transition density. The idiosyncratic component 21 Estimation is performed using kernel-weighted local polynomial regression. An alternative approach would be to model fertility as a choice variable. Recent papers that estimate life-cycle models with endogenous fertility decisions include Adda, Dustmann and Stevens (2017) and Eckstein, Keane and Lifshitz (2016) . Both approaches allow younger women to have greater fertility capital. 22 To limit the size of the state space, we represent children in the household by two state variables: the age of the youngest child y c , and the number of children n c . Assuming children exit the household at some fixed age, it is not possible to update n c exactly without knowing the age of all children. We proceed by approximating this law-of-motion by assuming that all children leave the household when the youngest child does so (at age 18).
is parametrised as Logistic, with mean µ θ ξ and common scale parameter σ θ . We impose µ θ L < µ θ H and therefore interpret ξ L and ξ H as respectively representing low and high quality marriages. While our theoretical model does not restrict the degree of across-cohort marital matching, in our application we restrict the maximal absolute age gap |a m − a f | ≤ ∆a max , which is equivalent to an absolute age difference no greater than 16 years. In our data, this is true for almost 99% of couples. We then allow the marriage matching efficiency parameter to depend upon age a and education s. We set
where K γ > 0 is a normalising constant.
Data
We use two data sources for our estimation. First, we use pooled data from the 2008-2015 American Community Survey (ACS) which provides us with information on education, marital patterns, marriage events, marriage durations, number of marriages, demographics, incomes, and labour supply. 23 Both the size of the sample and the kinds of information collected on the ACS, make it particularly well suited for analysing the age distribution of marriages. 24 We additionally use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal panel survey of a representative sample of U.S. individuals and families. 25 While 23 The ACS is the U.S. Census Bureau's replacement for the long form of the decennial census. The full implementation of the ACS, which began in 2005, provides timely information on a range of economic, demographic, and social outcomes. Beginning in 2008, the ACS asks questions about marital events that have occurred in the previous 12 months, the number of times a person has been married, and the year of the most recent marriage. These questions facilitate the analysis of marriage and divorce rates. 24 We obtain gender and age-specific mortality risk from life tables produced by the United States National Center for Health Statistics (see Elizabeth Arias, Melonie Heron and Xu, 2017) . These are used to construct gender and age-specific population sizes for a synthetic cohort. In calculating data moments, we apply a set of constructed weights. These weights are calculated to ensure consistency with the constructed population counts, while also being close to the empirical (joint age) marriage matching function. 25 The PSID began in 1968 with a sample of 4,800 U.S. families (including a low-income oversample). These original families, and the split-off families formed by children and other family unit members as they established their own households, have been re-interviewed on an annual basis from 1968-1997, and biennially since then. The survey collects information on a range of demographic, economic, and social outcomes over the life course of these families. the sample size is significantly smaller than the ACS, it provides us with measures of labour market experience and broad home production time that includes both housework and time spent with children. 26 Moreover, as a true panel data set, it allows rich labour market and marriage market histories to be constructed.
Estimation procedure
Existing empirical applications of limited commitment models (Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi, 2013; Bronson, 2015; Voena, 2015; Low et al., 2016) all use a simulation-based indirect inference estimation procedure (Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault, 1993) . In this approach, the dynamic programming problem is first solved given a candidate parameter vector, and an artificial dataset is then generated using the model data generating process. The objective of the estimation concerns the choice of parameter vector that minimises the distance between auxiliary parameters estimated on the actual data and the auxiliary parameters estimated on the simulated data. One of the main practical difficulties with simulation based estimation is that the objective function is typically non-smooth which precludes the use of gradient-based numerical optimization. 27 By virtue of characterising the equilibrium, our estimation procedure does not require simulation. 28 Conditional on the model parameter vector Θ we first solve the joint dynamic programming and marriage market equilibrium problem using the algorithm described in Appendix A. Note that the solution to this problem yields equilibrium joint distributions and policy functions. Thus, model moments/auxiliary parameters that condition on any subset of the dynamic programming state variables (such as marriage market matching patterns, marriage transitions, time allocation decisions, etc.) may be 26 Data on the time that parents spend with children is derived from the PSID Child Development Supplement (CDS) . The CDS provides detailed information on a subset of children from the PSID main interview sample, starting in 1997. We use data from both the initial wave and subsequent waves (2003, 2007, 2014) . We construct our childcare measure using the CDS child time diaries, which contain information including the type and duration of activities performed by the child, as well as information on who else was present or participation in each activity, over two 24-hour periods (a randomly sampled weekday and weekend day). For each of these 24 hour periods, we equate a parent's childcare time to the total time that the parent was participating in activities with the child, and impute a weekly measure by multiplying the weekday totals by 5 and the weekend day totals by 2. Given the diaries are at the child (not parent) level, to avoid double counting parental time in multi-child families, we exclude activity time for additional children when both the parent and a sibling were participating in that activity.
27 Non-smoothness naturally arises when there are discrete choices since a marginal change in the parameter vector may induce zero or discontinuous changes in behaviour and so the estimation distance metric. Sauer and Taber (2017) discuss the use of importance sampling to circumvent non-differentiability in indirect inference.
28 Estimation is performed using Artelys Knitro (Byrd, Nocedal and Waltz, 2006) . calculated directly. For example, the marriage rate for single women conditional on age would be given by
Moments that condition on variables that are not state variables of the dynamic programming problem are also of interest and may be calculated by constructing the respective match distributions. Importantly, this may be done following computation of the equilibrium in a non-iterative step. As a simple example, consider a moment that conditions on marriage duration τ d = 1, . . . , A, and (with slight abuse of notation) let g M (a, ω, ξ, λ, τ d ) denote the end-of-period measure of (a, ω, ξ, λ)-matches of duration τ d . Then for new
where g M (a, ω, ξ, λ, τ d ) naturally represents that start-of-period measure of matches of duration τ d . Note that in the above g S f (a f , ω f ), η f (a, ω), φ(a, ω, ξ, λ) , θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ), θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ), ψ f (a, ω, ξ, λ), and ψ m (a, ω, ξ, λ) are all independent of τ d and have been calculated as part of the initial equilibrium computation. Similar arguments can be used to calculate distributions with lagged employment, lagged wages, marital histories, and so on. 29 29 Depending upon the auxiliary parameter of interest, the characterisation and calculation may be more complicated compared to a simulation based estimation approach. In the context of within and across cohort marital matching, a simulation based procedure proceeds as follows. At the start of each period t, a fixed number of N sim women and N sim men are born in the single state, and all surviving individuals age one period. The new born ("generation t") individuals draw a state vector from the initial exogenous state distribution; individuals from older generations draw an update to their state vector depending on both their period t − 1 state vector and household allocation decision. Individuals are first randomly matched to another individual (uniquely characterised by a birth year, a gender, and an individual identifier i = 1, . . . , N sim ) according to the meeting probabilities. If they are both single, persistent and idiosyncratic marital shock component must be drawn and given these it is then determined whether the match will be consummated. Similarly, for individuals who were married at the start of the period, new persistent and idiosyncratic components are drawn and it is then evaluated whether that match will continue. For both new and surviving couples, the Pareto weight is adjusted if necessary. A vector of idiosyncratic From these equilibrium distributions and policy functions we construct a vector of moments m(Θ) that summarize both static and dynamic implications of the model, and that can be matched to moments m data calculated from the observed data. Given a positive definite weighting matrix W the objective of the estimation procedure is to choose the parameter vector Θ that minimises the weighted distance between model and empirical moments. Formally
Given the well-known problems associated with the use of the optimal weighting matrix (Altonji and Segal, 1996) , we choose W to be a diagonal matrix, whose element is proportional to the inverse of the diagonal variance-covariance matrix of the empirical moments. 30, 31 The full list of moments used to identify the model is provided in Appendix ??. For moments that may be calculated both with the ACS and PSID, we use the ACS because of the much larger sample size and the increased estimation precision that this offers. preference and wage shocks are obtained, and using the equilibrium values functions obtained from the initial dynamic programming problem, the allocation problem for both singles and couples may be drawn. With marriage matching across birth cohorts, it is necessary to forward simulate the economy for a large number of generations until a stationary distribution is obtained. This procedure yields a simulated panel dataset with A active generations, and with each generation characterised by a partial life-cycle history.
30 Our empirical moments are calculated using two data sources that have very different sample sizes. Consequently, the empirical moments from the ACS are estimated with much greater precision than are those from the PSID. To allow those from the PSID to have a meaningful influence in our estimation, we scale the corresponding elements of W by a fixed factor r 1. 31 The covariance matrix of our estimator is
where Σ is the covariance matrix of the empirical moments, and D m = ∂m sim (Θ)/∂Θ| Θ= Θ is the derivative matrix of the moment conditions with respect to the model parameters evaluated at Θ = Θ. Step 2: Initialization. Provide initial guesses for (i) the start-of-period 32 measures of marriage matches, g M (a, ω, ξ, λ) , and single women and men, g S f (a f , ω f ) and g S m (a m , ω m ), that are not known from Step 1; and (ii) the expected start-of-period value functions in the single states E V S f (a f , ω f ) and E V S m (a m , ω m ).
Step 3: Iteration. Iterate over the start-of-period expected value functions for single individuals, and the start-of-period measures of marriage matches, and single women and men, using the following sequence: (a, ω, ξ, λ) given current E V f (a + 1, ω , ξ , λ), E V m (a + 1, ω , ξ , λ) , and the state transition functions. This allows calculation of the threshold values, θ(a, ω, ξ) , θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ) , and θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ), as well as the transition function λ * (a, ω, ξ, θ, λ) , and therefore the start-of-period expected value functions E V f (a, ω, ξ, λ) and E V m (a, ω, ξ, λ) . These calculations imply the conditional choice probabilities for the joint allocation, P(t; a, ω, ξ, λ) .
c. Couples value functions, off-diagonal. For the age difference ∆a = 1, 2, . . . , A − 1 we compute the end-of-period expected value functions EV f ([A − ∆a, A], ω, ξ, λ) and EV m ([A, A − ∆a], ω, ξ, λ), exploiting that someone who is married to a spouse aged A today will be single next period. We then calculate the associated threshold match values as in Step 3b and the expected start-of-period expected value func-
, ω, ξ, λ), and E V m ([A, A − ∆a], ω, ξ, λ). Conditional on the age difference ∆a we iterate backwards with a = A − 1, . . . , ∆a + 1, and calculate objects for both (a − ∆a, a) and (a, a − ∆a) marriage pairings.
d. Update match distribution. Given the current guess of the start-of-period measures of married couples and singles, g M (a, ω, ξ, λ) , g S f (a f , ω f ), and g S m (a m , ω m ), and the threshold values θ (a, ω, ξ) , θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ) , and θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ) , the end-ofperiod measures, g M (a, ω, ξ, λ), g S f (a f , ω f ), and g S m (a m , ω m ), can be calculated. Using these end-of-period measures in conjunction with the known state transitions functions, as well the conditional choice probabilities that were calculated in Steps 3a-3c, yields an update to the start-of-period measures. 33 e. Update single expected value function. The current start-of-period single measures allows the meeting probabilities η f (a, ω) and η m (a, ω) to be calculated. These, together with the end-of-period expected value functions for single women and men (from Step 3a), EV S f (a f , ω f ) and EV S m (a m , ω m ), and the start-of-period expected values in marriage (from Step 3b and 3c), provides updated start-of-period expected values for single women and men, E V S f (a f , ω f ) and E V S m (a m , ω m ).
The distance between the updated and previous expected value functions and match distributions is evaluated. If it is less than the specified tolerance δ tol then terminate the iteration loop. Otherwise, return to Step 3a. Calculating expected value functions, and the measure of both single and matched individuals is central to our procedure. In Appendix A.2 we describe the numerical calculation of the start-of-period expected value functions, while in Appendix A.3 we describe the calculation of the match distribution.
weight λ(a, ω, ξ) that is associated with the reservation match value θ(a, ω, ξ). If both participation constraints simultaneously bind then this is obtained as the unique solution to EV f (a, ω, ξ, λ(a, ω, ξ) ) − EV S f (a f , ω f ) = EV m (a, ω, ξ, λ(a, ω, ξ) ) − EV S m (a m , ω m ). The reservation match value θ(a, ω, ξ) can then be obtained using the participation constraint of either spouse. We then construct an ordered λ-subgrid, which takes values λ subgrid = [λ 1 s , . . . , λ L s s ], with λ 1 s = λ(a, ω, ξ) and λ L s s = λ. Since the male participation is necessarily binding for all λ i s ∈ λ subgrid we calculate EV m (a, ω, ξ, λ i s ) by constructing an interpolating function through λ grid and then use the husband's participation constraint to obtain the associated match value θ i s = EV S m (a m , ω m ) − EV m (a, ω, ξ, λ i s ). By construction we have θ 1 s = θ (a, ω, ξ) and θ L s s = θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ) . The integrand is then evaluated at these match values using Newton-Cotes quadrature rules. To improve the accuracy of our numerical integration, we use more points on our subgrid when λ is close to 1 (as the range of θ when the husband's participation constraint binds is greater in this case). Note that this approach is more efficient than simply solving for λ * m (a, ω, ξ, θ) on an arbitrary θgrid. The calculation of the male start-of-period expected value function E V m (a, ω, ξ, λ) proceeds similarly.
A.3 Calculating the measure of matches
It is not possible to calculate the measure of marriage matches exactly as the Pareto weight is a continuous state variable. Instead, in characterising these measures we construct the discrete probability distribution over λ grid . Consider a couple with an initial Pareto weight λ j . If θ ≥ max{θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ j ), θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ j )} then both participation constraints are satisfied and the Pareto weight remains unchanged.
Suppose instead that θ(a, ω, ξ) ≤ θ < max{θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ j ), θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ j )}. In this case the couple will remain married, but the Pareto weight will adjust. In practice we adjust the weight in the woman's favour from λ j to λ i > λ j for all values of θ such that θ ≥ θ (a, ω, ξ) and θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ i ) < θ ≤ θ * f (a, ω, ξ, λ i−1 ). Similarly, we adjust the weight in the man's favour from λ j to λ i < λ j for all values of θ such that θ ≥ θ(a, ω, ξ) and θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ i+1 ) < θ ≤ θ * m (a, ω, ξ, λ i ). Suppressing the explicit conditioning on the other
